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Geoeconomics: The Democratic blueprint in historical 
perspective 
Tamás Péter Baranyi1  
“No two countries that both had McDonald’s had fought a war 
against each other since each got its McDonald’s” (Friedman 1999: ix). 
Abstract 
The article takes an evolutionary approach to the idea of geoeconomics. It presents the 
latter as a continuation and upgrade of post-Cold War triumphalism, neoliberal economic 
policies, and the Jimmy Carter-era human rights agenda, formulated into a single policy 
under the Clinton administration. As to the neoliberal component of this, the paper also 
discusses, briefly, what distinguishes the Democratic (liberal) and Republican 
(conservative) concepts of free trade. The article points out various sources to prove the 
link between the earlier policy elements and the eventually formulated policy. It also 
addresses the outlook on world affairs that was characteristic of the Clinton 
administration: the notion of “enlargement,” “geoeconomics,” and, pertaining to those 
outside this realm, the idea of rogue states and isolation. At the end of the paper, an 
evaluation is given on whether Clinton’s policies worked or not, and if one may offer a 
coherent definition of geoeconomics based on the practices observed. 
Keywords: geoeconomics, Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, human rights, Reaganite, free 
trade, regional integration, human rights, Democratic Party, trade wars 
Introduction 
Although largely fallen out of fashion by now, geoeconomics was once a key term for 
American foreign policy and in fact became a buzzword in international relations at the 
time. Less popular than its progenitor, “geopolitics,” geoeconomics came to define almost 
the entire 1990s. As with most concepts that had manifested during practice, went on to 
academia, and ended up again at the decision-makers’ table, it does not have a standard 
definition – it has a set of interpretations. 
1 Historian, international relations expert. Currently the Head of Research at Antall József Knowledge 
Center (2015–). 
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The purpose of this study is to give a generic understanding of the term, to trace 
the origins of a concept that came to define Clinton years U.S. foreign affairs. In so doing, 
it is first necessary to clarify what we do not imply by geoeconomics: it is not “economic 
statecraft,” or using economic means to reach political goals (such use is not rare; see 
Blackwill & Harris 2016). Geoeconomics in this sense is less and more holistic at the 
same time. Less holistic, as it refers to a set of economic policies, connected to the realm 
of neoliberalism; on the other hand more holistic in terms of its purpose, as the desired 
aims here are not specific political or economic gains but a thorough transformation of 
the whole landscape of international politics. 
In this study, we first summarize the sources of Clintonian geoeconomics in depth: 
a shift in security perceptions after the Cold War, the resilient force of neoliberal 
economics, and an undertow of foreign policy ideas of the Carter presidency. Then we 
move on to define the underpinnings and the implementation of geoeconomics during the 
Clinton era. Besides the evolution of the whole idea of geoeconomics and enlargement, 
we will take a glance at some of the collateral implications such as the notion of rogue 
states. In the last part, we try to evaluate what geoeconomics achieved, and how the 
concept can be identified in light of what we observe. 
Due to the length and focus of the paper, we cannot address the issue of what has 
remained of the approach after the “return of geopolitics” (Russel Mead, 2016); the 
question of whether the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is an 
offshoot of geoeconomics; and what the chances for a return to this idea in the upcoming 
U.S. presidency may be. 
 
A declaration of peace 
Although, as we shall see later, Clintonian foreign policy has its roots in both the Carter 
administration’s outlook as well as the Reaganite economic turn, its defining factor was 
the way security perceptions transformed at the Cold War’s end. If the year 1989 was that 
of miraculous changes, the year 1990 was that of triumph. Not only was the Cold War 
over, and Eastern Europe back on the right track, but some other hot spots were cooling 
off: ruthless dictatorships transitioned into democracy on the Southern cone, major wars 
seemed to be coming to an end from the Persian Gulf (Iran—Iraq) to Afghanistan (with 
the departure of Soviet troops in 1989). Even the drugs trade and terrorism seemed to be 
in decline. 
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Clearly, the defining antagonism of the past 40 years – the hostile and 
preponderant power of the Soviet Union – was over. A notion that had actually been 
formulated during the Cold War, that of “great power peace” (Knight 1982), did not 
exactly set in, but international relations between the major powers clearly entered into a 
new phase: the superpowers were no longer keeping each other in check. Rather, neither 
of them now had the intention to induce hostilities. Great power peace has in this sense 
become one of the key terms to understand the 1990s. 
Great power peace has enabled both superpowers to withdraw from Europe. Such 
a withdrawal was nothing like anything forecast during the Cold War: it was neither 
mutual, nor symmetric. The Soviet Union had to withdraw completely for obvious 
economic and legitimacy issues, while the United States disengaged only selectively and 
partially. Still, there was anxiety over unintentionally creating a power vacuum in Europe. 
The American decisions (mostly supported by the Soviet Union at the time) not to 
withdraw completely from Europe, not to dismantle NATO, and to approve of German 
reunification in the framework of NATO and the CSCE (the Conference on Security and 
Co-operation in Europe), were in large part due to this anxiety. Military developments 
were complemented with political changes: new formations came into being (the 
Visegrad Group, the Baltics) and older ones were on the way of upgrading (e.g. the EU 
with the Single European Act). Under such circumstances, the concept of the “peace 
dividend” arose, according to which in a more integrated, politically engaged, militarily 
non-adversarial world each country can afford to spend less on defense and more on 
domestic problems and the goals of further integration. 
Now that the Soviet Union was no longer an adversary, the United Nations, as the 
post-war (post-WWII) structure of international politics could also be reshaped. Even 
George H. W. Bush, never prone to enthusiasm, believed in the coming of a “new world 
order” in which “the United Nations—freed from Cold War stalemate—is poised to fulfill 
the historic vision of its founders” (qtd. in Hyland, 1999: 5). During the days of the Cold 
War, great power competition and obstructionism relegated the role of the U.N. to that of 
manager of minor conflicts in developing countries. Now that four out of five Security 
Council permanent members (U.S., U.K., France and Russia) were genuine democracies, 
and even the sole remaining authoritarian regime, China embraced market economy, 
openness, and maybe even a degree of human rights, the world organization could start 
afresh as the gendarme of the world. 
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This new world order has been sealed by two peripheral conflicts: the American 
invasion of Panama in 1989 and the Gulf War in 1990–91. Panama was perhaps the first 
U.S. intervention in forty years that did not spark either the usual Soviet propaganda 
campaign or progressive protests around the globe based on the “anticolonial narrative.” 
The Gulf War is notable for being the first military action to have been sanctioned by the 
U.N. since the Korean War – this was possible because Moscow did not use its veto, but 
(mis)used absenteeism on the U.N. Security Council. It seemed that America has finally 
shaken off the Cold War legitimation deficit (at the U.N.) and, overall, the role of the 
international boogeyman. It looked as if everyone with a good sense could support the 
“new world order,” and that those who were against it would not invite even minimal 
public sympathy. 
Under such optimistic considerations, in a triumphant mood, we can consider 
these years as a declaration of peace. In Bush’s inauguration speech, still in 1989, the new 
era was called “peaceful and prosperous,” in which “in man's heart, if not in fact, the day 
of the dictator is over.” Not only war and tyranny are over, but ideology as a whole: “For 
the first time in this century […] man does not have to invent a system by which to live. 
We don't have to talk late into the night about which form of government is better” (Bush 
1989). Even if there was no universal peace on Earth, there was a certain atmosphere as 
well as a declaration that the era of big wars was over. 
 
The Resilience of Reaganite neoliberalism 
Ronald Reagan came to the White House with a strong conviction that the era of big 
government was over. His commitment to unregulated market economy was manifested 
in the early months of his tenure, especially in measures of tax reduction, the deregulation 
of business, and cuts in large government programs. This sweeping change—that was 
going to lose momentum after 1982—was so radical a departure from the post-war 
economic consensus that many dubbed the U.S. presidential election of 1980 the “Reagan 
Revolution” (Prasad 2006: 44–47). The “revenge” of free market economy was not 
confined to Reagan’s America; it was a worldwide trend in the 1980s. This New Right 
considered Keynesian, statist economics as a sub-variety of socialism. Their seminal 
work was Friedrich Hayek’s Road to Serfdom (1943) in which the author argues that state 
intervention in markets inevitably leads to political tyranny. Reagan was himself very 
committed to this idea. In the president’s own words, “For the free market to work, 
everyone has to compete on an equal footing. [...] Free competition produces better 
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products and lower prices” (Reagan 1990: 355). In fact, the Reaganite self-confidence 
and resolution in foreign policy came from a deep belief in the superiority of the American 
economy which he had encapsulated in the phrase “we can outspend them forever” 
(Gaddis 2005: 375–376). In the specific field of promoting free trade across the globe, 
there was a major development during the Reagan administration: frustrated by European 
countries blocking global initiatives, in 1982, the administration shifted from the previous 
American stance of endorsing global economic liberalization to a new one that favored 
regional free trade agreements (Frankel 2001: 8). 
The Reagan Revolution was not a national but a worldwide phenomenon. The 
president himself observed that he had preached market economy in subsequent world 
economic forums, and year by year more people seemed convinced by this (Reagan 1990: 
356). Mrs. Thatcher had a similar outlook to Reagan’s, as had President Mitterrand in 
France and many other leaders in developed countries. Even the Federal Republic of 
Germany had a slight turn to neoliberalism – up to this point, they had been the textbook 
example of the center-right Keynesian welfare state (Prasad 2006: 162). Even those states, 
however, who did not adopt neoliberal market economics, adopted its language and used 
it to legitimize their own measures and policies. Neoliberal policies increasingly seemed 
to be the answer to all problems on earth. The U.S. for her part embarked on the promotion 
of neoliberal values and chose the World Bank as the key instrument for this. For some 
time, the World Bank was even considered as a possible substitute for an impotent and 
hostile U.N. (Susan Engel 2010: 55–65).2  
Triumphalism and a firm belief in free trade were mutually reinforcing trends. 
Reagan, in his 1988 State of the Union Address, mentioned that the place of the “Blame 
America” of the 1970s was taken by “Look up to America”. He further added: “One of 
the greatest contributions the United States can make to the world is to promote freedom 
as the key to economic growth. A creative, competitive America is the answer to a 
changing world, not trade wars that would close doors […]” (Reagan 1988). So the 
American “best practice” was not only a remedy for the economic recession and a tool to 
win the Cold War but also the greatest export the U.S. can trade with. The promotion of 
the free market was boosted by its success and the transformation it made in America.  
                                                          
2 Later the overeager World Bank approach was heavily criticized for its detached attitude to the 
humanitarian and political costs of rapid deregulation, especially in connection with the reform packages 
elaborated for Asia and Latin America in the late 1980s. 
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There is one question that needs to be addressed – if not solved – with regard to 
the return of the divide between Neoconservative and Neoliberal economic policies. On 
the surface, both promote free trade and enterprise, lower tariffs and the elimination of 
trade barriers. It is very hard to tell the difference, but there are certainly differences in 
tones. The Democratic Party had the pro-market orientation of the 1980s Republicans and 
married that with traditional Democratic values such as concern for the environment and 
progressive taxation (Frankel–Orszag 2001). Another difference is the perception of 
agency. For the Republicans, free trade is a value attached to people who are brave and 
responsible enough to compete in a world undistorted by state interventions. For the 
Democrats, however, economic integration is an impersonal phenomenon that would 
eventually prevail, with no regard to personal values or misgivings. Where the Democrats 
believed in the forces of globalization, Republicans believed in the importance of the 
political and the personal. As a contemporary editor of The National Interest saw it, 
“where the libertarians subscribed to the primacy of the economic and older American 
conservatives hankered after a primacy of culture, the neocons thoroughly believed in the 
'primacy of the political'” (paraphrased by Jan Werner-Müller, CHCW [2010] III. 10). In 
close connection to this, one can argue that free trade and an interconnected world were 
teleological objectives for the Democrats, while only a tool for the Republicans. 
 
The Carter boys and girls 
The focus of this paper is on the Bill Clinton presidency but an ample outlook is needed. 
The most important members of the foreign policy community under the Clinton 
administration had, in fact, a common experience: their training during the Carter years. 
To list only the most important personalities, Warren Christopher was Deputy Secretary 
of State under Carter, Madeleine Albright was congressional liaison for the National 
Security Council from 1978, Tony Lake was the Director of the Policy Planning Staff 
(both Albright and Lake were close to U.S. Senator Edmund Muskie), while Al Gore was 
congressman (D-TN). Even the academic Joseph Nye was Deputy to the Undersecretary 
of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology between 1977 and 1979. They 
were, in fact, minor members of the administration, the top leaders of which were 
Brzezinski and Cyrus Vance. Vance joined the United Nations as a special envoy and 
thus played a role in global politics in the 1990s. Brzezinski withdrew to academia and 
became a major critique of Clinton – though his son Mark became a member of the 
national security team. 
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The connection between the Carter and the Clinton years is not only personal, 
though. In fact, one of the key tenets of the Clinton administration, that of the 
prioritization of human rights, was a Carter-era invention. Not Carter’s own, but an 
invention of the era. As one researcher observed, “Carter did not initiate the discussion 
of human rights; he rode a wave that had been growing since the end of WorId War II 
and that had gained momentum in 1975 when the United States […] signed the Helsinki 
Accords. Many in the United States, including Carter had denounced Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger and President Gerald R. Ford for signing an agreement that seemed to 
legitimate Soviet domination of Eastern Europe” (CHCW [2010] III. 71). Kissinger in his 
White House Years cites the issue of human rights as something that brought together the 
opposition of Nixon and détente from both sides of the aisle (Kissinger 2011: 1474, also 
Gaddis 2005: 345). Furthermore, Hanhimäki observes that in the wake of the Watergate 
scandal, the emergence of such a dichotomy narrative between the immoral and abusive 
Nixonian détente and the morally well-founded opposition was inevitable (Hanhimäki 
2013: 77–80). Human rights thus became a cornerstone of the Democratic line of 
American foreign policy. 
There is one more, slightly connected issue that is quite a continuation between 
the Carter and Clinton administrations: the notion of intervention. The basic contradiction 
related to this was that any kind of major foreign intervention was unimaginable after the 
conclusion of the Vietnam War both because of domestic opposition and due to how this 
would affect the global image of the U.S. (Hanhimäki 2013: 105). On the other hand, a 
human rights agenda required the threat of intervention as a deterrent, perhaps even more 
than Realpolitik. Such a duality of approach, i.e. the maintenance of the détente, and the 
promotion of human rights proved not only contradictory but a mere impossibility. Soviet 
Ambassador to Washington D.C. Anatoly Dobrinyn later recalled, “Whether Carter 
meant it or not, his policy was based on linking détente to the domestic situation in the 
Soviet Union. This represented an abrupt departure from the policy followed by the 
preceding administrations, inevitably making his relations with Moscow very tense” (qtd. 
in Gaddis 2005: 345). At the end of the Carter presidency, however, it looked like Carter 
compromised both détente and human rights (Cohen 1993: 215–217). 
On this issue, the most important persons had very different views: Brzezinski 
was more of an interventionist, while Cyrus Vance was less so. Carter imagined he may 
himself represent a synthesis between the two positions. The White House Chief of Staff 
summarized Carter’s thinking: “Zbig would be the thinker, Cy would be the doer, and 
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Jimmy would be the decider” (qtd. in Hanhimaki 2013: 105). Instead, this became a 
source of constant rivalry and disunity. Brzezinski later recalled: “Carter should have 
fired Vance. Or should have fired me. Or I should have shut up. I didn’t know how much 
it was hurting the presidency” (qtd. in CHCW [2010] III. 68). The limits of the use of 
American power, the morality thereof, and the actual decisions came to define the major 
foreign policy debates during the Clinton era as well. 
 
Early Clinton administration: The road to enlargement 
Bill Clinton was considered a foreign policy “rookie” by every standard when he assumed 
the presidency in January 1993, but his experiences were strikingly insufficient when 
compared to George H. W. Bush whom he defeated during the U.S. presidential election 
of 1992 (Magyarics 2014: 591). Bush did not play up this weakness, but in fact he ardently 
supported the idea that the Democratic candidate, especially after officially winning the 
nomination, receive the President’s Daily Brief on intelligence matters. From September 
1992, Clinton – and his then-top-adviser on foreign policy Sandy Berger – received 
intelligence reports regularly in Clinton’s home town Little Rock, Arkansas. Moreover, 
they personally met members of the intelligence community to pose probing questions or 
seek for further clarification and explanation. During these talks, the most interesting 
feature was the priority given to those issues that Clinton later prioritized during his 
presidency: Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia, reforms in Russia, GATT negotiations in Europe, etc. 
After winning the elections of 1992, Clinton and the intelligence community continued 
to work together, albeit now relocated to Washington D.C. The president-elect, after some 
consideration, in an unprecedented move, decided that the President’s Daily Brief should 
be discussed with the designated Secretary of Treasury as well (Helgerson 2001). 
Soon after, Clinton made his first foreign policy speech at the American University. 
His firm commitment to the economy – echoed during the campaign in the slogan “It’s 
the economy, stupid!” – was made clear again. This was probably the first presidential 
act that was designed to set the mold for his foreign economic policy. In the speech, he 
castigated both the protectionist Left and the laissez-faire Right: 
“[I]t is time for us to make trade a priority element of American security. For too 
long, debates over trade have been dominated by voices from the extremes. One says 
Government should build walls to protect firms from competition. Another says 
Government should do nothing in the face of foreign competition, no matter what 
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the dimension and shape of that competition is, no matter what the consequences are 
in terms of job losses, trade dislocations, or crushed incomes.” (Clinton 1993) 
Further, he reaffirmed the 1982 shift in American foreign policy from FDR’s trade 
universalism to favoring smaller, regional pacts (of which all could eventually attach 
later): 
Too many of the chains that have hobbled us in world trade have been made in 
America. Our trade policy will also bypass the distracting debates over whether 
efforts should be multilateral, regional, bilateral, unilateral. The fact is that each of 
these efforts has its place. Certainly we need to seek to open other nations' markets 
and to establish clear and enforceable rules on which to expand trade. (Clinton 1993) 
The incoming Clinton Administration in 1993 faced a series of challenges and 
opportunities. For the third time in 20th century history, America was given a role (this 
time a blank check) to shape the politics of the future (Magyarics 2014: 579–583). The 
general outlook of the Clinton Administration derived from the following axioms: 
1) With the USSR collapsed, no major external threat is likely from state actors. 
Democracy, capitalism, and unipolarity are all factors working against future wars. 
(See: Doyle 1993.) 
2) The world has dramatically changed. After the Cold War, personal and leadership 
issues are not priorities. Great changes happen because of worldwide trends, not 
because of resolute leadership. (See Friedman 1998: 8–15.)  
3) History has a definite direction, and that is towards ever-expanding economic 
and political integration. (See: Fukuyama 1992.) 
4) History has proven that economies are stronger if more open. (See: Clinton 1993) 
5) America’s leadership must be claimed in the field of the global economy. (See: 
Clinton 1993.) 
This is, of course, a rather arbitrary listing of main ideas, but as seen previously, 
most of them are rooted in the Democratic or progressive policy traditions, as well as in 
a firm belief in free trade. It may be amended or reduced but it still highlights how the 
early Clinton administration thought of foreign and international politics in 1993. 
The personal picks of Clinton seemed safe-zone appointments, and signaled an 
obvious return of the Carter administration’s second echelon. Madeleine Albright, 
Warren Christopher or Treasury’s Lloyd Bensten were relatively unexperienced and 
passive, but all of them had links as old Carter democrats (Gowan 1999: 77). 
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Neoconservatives and Reagan Democrats, who started to support Clinton during the 
campaign, disillusioned with the new administration almost overnight. As Penn Kemble, 
a leading personality of this group then wrote, “individuals from our community are being 
edged aside as the new Administration takes shape... old Democratic networks are, 
naturally enough, promoting their own jobs... you have to understand the need for a kind 
of affirmative action on our behalf” (qtd. in Bouchet 2015: 19). Another prominent figure 
of the neoconservatives, Joshua Muravchik put it this way: 
“Almost from Day One after the election victory we felt as if we had been suckered. 
When we first heard that he was considering Warren Christopher for secretary of 
state, I said ‘that can’t be serious’. Christopher had never had to my knowledge a 
single thought about foreign policy. He was just a lawyer. This just meant ‘I don’t 
want to have a foreign policy, Christopher’s main job is just to rule as many things 
out from requiring attention as possible’.” (qtd. in Bouchet: 19). 
However, it is true that a stronger economic policy team was built behind Clinton: Robert 
Rubin, Ira Magaziner, Laura Tyson, Robert Reich, and especially Mickey Kantor and Al 
Gore were the masterminds behind Clinton’s foreign economic policy. The team was 
often called “the globalists,” and, as one expert succinctly put it, “The new concept was 
that competition among states was shifting from the domain of politico–military resources 
and relations to the field of control of sophisticated technologies and the domination of 
markets. The nature of the new game was also given a new name: ‘geoeconomics’” 
(Gowan 1999: 77). Gore was a particularly influential person, who as Vice President did 
not have great official influence but had a decisive impact on people’s attitudes and 
policies. A source of inspiration for Gore was Cordell Hull (Franklin D. Roosevelt’s State 
Secretary from 1933 to 1944), a fellow Tennessean, a family friend of the Gores. Hull 
was himself a symbol for the global undertaking of America, free trade, and the 
continuation of Democratic traditions (Boys 2015: 166). It was also Gore who found 
federal funds to save Hull’s cabin birthplace in Tennessee (Brinkley 1997: 119). Gore 
was also a staunch supporter of innovation, environmentalism, and information 
technology. He was an authentic, albeit sometimes clumsy representative of these new 
issues.3  
                                                          
3 Gore once had an unfortunate statement that became widely cited: that he had “invented” the internet. 
Naturally, what he meant was that he contributed a lot to the spread of the civilian use of the internet. 
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In the meantime, Clinton’s early months saw a rise of problems in many 
prioritized fields, and the administration faced criticism about its vague and reactive 
foreign policy. Three months after inauguration, Clinton only added fuel to the fire with 
such throwaway remarks that “foreign policy is not what I came here to do” (Ambrose–
Brinkley 1997).4 Following the early debacles of Somalia (known as the Battle of 
Mogadishu, eternalized by the Hollywood movie Black Hawk Down), and another serious 
humiliation in Haiti, the Clinton team needed a whole new concept. U.S. Secretary of 
Defense Les Aspin and Secretary of State Warren Christopher filed their resignations. 
After some consideration, Clinton accepted the former and refused the latter, while he 
also blamed Bush’s concept the “new world order” for the events that occurred. Against 
this backdrop, Clinton assigned National Security Adviser Anthony Lake to formulate a 
new policy with a strong and meaningful narrative, with one single catchphrase that could 
serve as a “compass” to foreign policy (Poppe 2010: 10, also Ambrose–Brinkley 1997). 
Anthony Lake set up a task force to find that compass. There were two early 
versions, democratic engagement and democratic expansionism. Jeremy Rosner, a 
speechwriter at the National Security Council then coined the word enlargement. Rosner 
put this new phrase to the test with many colleagues, and having had positive feedback, 
told the idea to Lake who instantly liked it (Ambrose–Brinkley 1997).  
In September 1993, Lake gave a speech entitled “From Containment to 
Enlargement” that was to formulate the new agenda. Clinton only made minor changes 
to the text before authorizing it (Bouchet 2015: 21). 
 
“I see four components to the strategy of enlargement. 
First, we should strengthen the community of major market democracies5  – 
including our own – which constitutes the core from which enlargement is 
proceeding. 
Second, we should help foster and consolidate new democracies and market 
economies, where possible, especially in states of special significance and 
opportunity. 
Third, we must counter the aggression – and support the liberalization – of states 
hostile to democracy and markets. 
                                                          
4 Citations from Ambrose–Brinkley (1997) are without page numbers due to the unavailability of a hard 
copy. However, the bibliography points to an online version that is easily and freely usable and searchable. 
5 Market democracy is in fact a word coined by Bill Clinton himself. Cf. Poppe 2010: 11. 
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Fourth, we need to pursue our humanitarian agenda not only by providing aid, but 
also by working to help democracy and market economics take root in regions of 
greatest humanitarian concern. 
A host of caveats must accompany a strategy of enlargement. For one, we must be 
patient. As scholars observe waves of democratic advance are often followed by 
reverse waves of democratic setback. We must be ready for uneven progress, even 
outright reversals. […] Our strategy must view democracy broadly -- it must envision 
a system that includes not only elections but also such features as an independent 
judiciary and protections of human rights.” (Lake 1993) 
 
A week later, at the UN General Assembly, Clinton further stated, “During the Cold War, 
we sought to contain a threat to the survival of free institutions. Now we seek to enlarge 
the circle of nations that live under those free institutions” (qtd. in Bouchet 2015: 22). 
The speech and the plan also devised priorities: first came the traditional allies in Western 
Europe, then the fresh democracies in Eastern Europe and Asia, then the Western 
Hemisphere, and last the backlash states like Iraq or Iran (Bouchet 2015: 22). 
 
A world safe for free trade 
The formulation of foreign (economic) policy was picking up speed. Clinton set up, 
already in 1993, the so-called U.S. National Economic Council, a body that was to mirror 
the National Security Council to take the former’s ultimate planning role in the Cold War 
in this post-Cold War environment (Gowan 1999: 78). The signing of the North American 
Free Trade Association created a vast free trade zone in the Americas, albeit the bulk of 
negotiations were already done by the Bush administration. Yet another victory was the 
Uruguay Round Agreement of GATT (effective in December 1994) which did not 
significantly lower tariffs in the U.S. (being one of the most open economies since 1945) 
but did a lot to lower them in other countries. It also created the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) as a new international regime. In Seattle, Clinton brought together 15 Asian heads 
of state to form the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation, i.e. APEC, which since then 
became an essential player in East Asian economic policy (Ambrose–Brinkley 1997). 
The economy became indeed the heart of U.S. foreign policy. Robert Rubin led 
the National Economic Council to dovetail domestic and foreign economic policy. U.S. 
Trade Representative Mickey Kantor travelled across the globe in the company of Fortune 
500 CEOs to promote a new “open door policy” (Ambose–Brinkley 1997). A new 
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document was drafted to further clarify what the Clinton agenda meant: it was called the 
En-En document, or officially: the National Security Strategy of Enlargement and 
Engagement (1994). The title itself was also a synthesis: that of engagement (favored by 
Gary Hart, State Department) and enlargement (Tony Lake/Jeremy Rosner) (Saphire 
1994). According to Clinton’s foreword to the document, 
“We believe that our goals of enhancing our security, bolstering our economic 
prosperity, and promoting democracy are mutually supportive. Secure nations are 
more likely to support free trade and maintain democratic structures. Nations with 
growing economies and strong trade ties are more likely to feel secure and to work 
toward freedom. And democratic states are less likely to threaten our interests and 
more likely to cooperate with the U.S. to meet security threats and promote 
sustainable development.” (National Security Strategy 1994: ii) 
Accordingly, the Clinton administration set about developing the ways and means 
to promote free trade and American values further. Russia was an especially successful 
case. Boris Yeltzin’s presidency was committed to capitalism and democracy, and this let 
the American free-trade-promoting agenda very efficient. Indeed, the “breaking up”6 of 
Russia went ahead with unprecedented pace: by 1996, already 120,000 state-run 
companies had been privatized and the numbers were still running high (Ambrose–
Brinkley 1997).  China was also an essential part of the policy of enlargement, itself being 
still a planned economy and an authoritarian regime. Clinton criticized Bush for 
stabilizing normal relations with China after the violent crackdown on the Tiananmen 
Square protests, and pledged to link MFN (Most Favored Nation) status to significant 
change in China’s human rights record. As China’s MFN status needed to be renewed 
each year, the issue generated a series of debates every year. Finally, as Beijing did not 
budge on the issue of human rights, the Clinton administration stepped back. The move 
was framed as a victory in the name of free trade and American interest, albeit criticism 
was strong for abandoning the human rights agenda (Boys 2015: 187–188). In 2000, 
Clinton signed legislation that let China enter into the WTO, while the country’s MFN 
status was made permanent a year later. 
Problems came up in Japan as well. Negotiations collapsed in 1994 because Tokyo 
did not want to let the American cellphones industry in. The U.S. switched to a big stick 
                                                          
6 Another study may deal with the language of this new American policy. “Breaking up” economies and 
promoting “open door policy” belongs to a linguistic domain used by 19th century colonialism that likely 
did not go unnoticed with non-Western countries, or, for that matter, with Russia. 
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policy. As Clinton put it, “America for ten years tried thirty different trade agreements, 
and nothing ever happened.... [T]he trade deficit just got bigger and bigger. So we’re 
going to try to pursue a much more aggressive policy now which will actually open 
markets” (qtd. in Ambrose–Brinkley 1997). Using the big stick was the source of a great 
deal of criticism against the Clinton administration. Eminent Indian economist Jagdish 
Bagwhati bashed the Clinton administration for “bullying” China, Japan, and Mexico 
with free trade policies – though of course China was not that easy to be bullied (Frankel 
2001: 9–10). Partisan or ideological criticism was even more important, especially after 
January 1995, when the Republican Party overtook both houses of Congress. Lawrence 
Kaplan, for instance, heavily criticized Clinton: 
“The Clinton White House characterizes its own approach to foreign affairs as 
“pragmatic neo-Wilsonianism,’ but Woodrow Wilson, as it happens, entered office 
with the explicit intention of putting an end to the ‘dollar diplomacy’ of the Taft 
administration. In international affairs, the true inclinations of the Clintonites bear a 
much closer resemblance to the policies of Harding, Coolidge, and Hoover – and, 
like theirs, the new policy comes clothed in high-minded rhetoric.” (Kaplan 1998) 
Kaplan cites a set of examples when Clinton’s priorities of democracy promotion and 
trade relations were in conflict. For instance, Clinton said that there was a “national 
emergency” because of WMD (i.e. Weapons of Mass Destruction) proliferation 
(especially in former USSR countries), but at the same time he strove to abolish COCOM, 
a multilateral organization that used to monitor high-tech exports. Kaplan also points out 
the hypocrisy behind castigating small, insignificant members of the international 
community (Burma, Cuba, etc.) for their human rights records, but leaving aside those of 
China (Kaplan 1998). Kaplan, like most Republicans, entertained a totally different idea 
of the link between stability and trade. As he put it, 
“Is it really necessary to point out that, even in an era of globalization, commercial 
ties are properly an effect, not a cause, of political stability? In the serene conviction 
that things are the other way around, the White House has been recklessly testing a 
proposition that has been found wanting over and over again in this century: the 
theory that trade and war are incompatible. The European flirtation with this idea in 
the period prior to World War I ended decisively at the Marne.” (Kaplan 1998) 
Yet another source of criticism was the unwillingness to use force for human rights 
purposes. After the interventions in Somalia and Haiti, a general notion of non-
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intervention was very tangible in Washington D.C. As Robert Brinkley put it, writing in 
Foreign Affairs, these countries did not have the prospective capability to develop major 
consumer middle classes, and so they were on the periphery of the American sphere of 
interest (Brinkley 199). Such a prioritization is normal, but when it came to human rights 
violations and the largest post-World War II genocide in history in Ruanda (1994), it 
indeed generated a long-lasting credibility deficit on the side of the Clinton 
administration. 
The second Clinton administration saw a shift in many respects. One was a newly 
added point to the Clinton agenda: peacemaking. The president used his personal 
negotiating skills and American power to settle minor but resilient conflicts across the 
globe. He tried in vain to make peace in Israel and Palestine, but he was more successful 
in Northern Ireland. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 effectively ended the violent 
conflict in that part of the world, with the serious mediation of U.S. Senator George 
Mitchell. A year before, Clinton was successful in brokering the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty, albeit it was not really “comprehensive,” with India, Pakistan, and North 
Korea not joining. By far the most important conflict to settle was that in the former 
Yugoslavia. Overcoming reluctance and hesitancy, six months after the massacre at 
Srebrenica, IFOR forces stepped up efforts to make peace on the Balkan Peninsula. In 
November 1995, the peace accords were signed in Dayton, Ohio under the tutelage of 
Richard Holbrooke and Warren Christopher (Ambrose–Brinkley 1997). 
Problems in Eastern Europe led to other landmark Clinton administration 
decisions: first the establishment of Partnership for Peace, and then the expansion of 
NATO. Partnership for Peace (PfP) proved successful in terms of engagement policy. In 
Bosnia more than a dozen states contributed to NATO troops, and Hungary actually 
became the largest staging ground for American troops during the operation. Secretary of 
Defense William Perry praised the idea: “PFP is not just ‘defense by other means’ but 
‘democracy by other means,’ and it is helping turn George Marshall’s dream of a 
democratic and unified Europe into a reality” (Ambrose–Brinkley 1997). In October 
1996, Clinton made a speech in Detroit about NATO’s enlargement. In this speech, he 
stated that some Warsaw Pact countries should join the North Atlantic Alliance at the 
Alliance’s 50th anniversary. He further said, 
“[T]he new NATO should do for Europe’s East what the Marshall Plan and the 
Alliance did for Europe’s West. [It] should not just deter outside aggression ... but 
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serve as a force for integration, democratization, and stability in Europe.” (NATO 
1996)  
As it may be obvious from the speech as well as from the analysis of many 
observers, the enlargement of NATO was not conceived in the framework of military 
expansion but rather as a more holistic expansion of democracies. Here the Clinton 
administration faced the conflict of interests between its general attitude to keep costs low 
and its determination to promote “market democracies.” The case became more urgent 
because PfP proved not to be sufficient. Eastern European leaders urged more formal 
enlargement, and the Yugoslav wars obliterated the hopes of European peace (Kupchan 
2001: 131). 
Whether such an eastward expansion was advisable or not was a bone of contention 
within the administration itself. Actually, a new divide has emerged between those who 
wanted less or more activism throughout the world. Lake’s concept of enlargement was 
too much for people like Gary Hart or Warren Christopher.  As Christopher’s sway started 
to fade, Madeleine Albright’s was on the rise and she definitely brought new stresses into 
the administration (Boys 2015: 87). Coming from Czechoslovakia, Albright was not 
convinced of the wisdom of focusing on trade policy alone and her tenure as State 
Secretary brought about a more virulent freedom agenda. Also, her new approach was 
less global than before: European integration and China were now prioritized over Haiti, 
Japan, or even non-proliferation (Bouchet 2015: 29). A more hawkish Albright was State 
Secretary when another round of the Yugoslav wars of succession broke out which 
resulted in the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999. 
 
The rogue states contradiction 
The framework of enlargement and engagement had certain provisions: that democratic 
states are less willing to fight one another, that free trade and free institutions are mutually 
reinforcing, the forces of globalization are on the side of further integration, and that the 
whole globe was set to participate in such an engagement. Naturally, not everyone was 
of the same opinion. The question arose: what to do with countries that are not willing to 
accept the fruits and benefits of globalization and engagement? 
The term “backlash states” occurred already in Tony Lake’s “From Containment 
to Enlargement” speech, but it later became somewhat transformed and was given a 
central position. It was in fact transformed, as the idea of “rogue states” was even earlier 
formulated: in the U.S. Army during the Bush administration. The relatively good 
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relations between the outgoing and the incoming administration, as well as Clinton’s 
purported softness in military affairs resulted in borrowing the term and the concept of 
“rogue states” (Miles 2013: 23–24). 
Vis-à-vis those countries that were unwilling to advert to democracy and the 
market economy, the Clinton administration upheld or even expanded trade sanctions and 
imposed isolation. That was the case with Cuba, where the bloqueo, the comprehensive 
embargo, was not lifted but was expanded in 1999. Although in the same year Clinton 
eased some of the sanctions against North Korea, most of them were upheld or expanded 
against Burma, Iran, or Iraq. These countries came to define the term rogue state. Arms 
embargoes were almost universal against these countries throughout the 1990s and, in 
fact, ever since then. 
Rogue nations were no longer separable from rogue behaviors: terrorism, drug-
trafficking, or human rights abuses. Rogue non-state actors were at the same time 
empowered to some extent by Clinton’s early foreign policy gaffes. A Somali warlord, 
for example claimed that “we know how to get rid of the Americans, by killing them so 
that public opinion will put an end to things.” Osama bin Laden also used the Somali 
example: “when tens of your soldiers were killed in minor battles […] you left the area 
carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat, and your dead with you. Clinton appeared 
in front of the whole world threatening and promising revenge, but these threats were 
merely a preparation for withdrawal. You have been disgraced by Allah and you 
withdrew; the extent of your impotence and weaknesses became very clear” (qtd. in 
Dueck 2006: 143). The challenge posed by rogue states and rogue non-state actors was 
thus very urgent. 
In 1995, before the UN General Assembly, President Clinton addressed the issue of 
rogue nations and global interconnectedness: 
“All over the world, people yearn to live in peace. And that dream is becoming a 
reality. But our time is not free of peril. As the cold war gives way to the global 
village, too many people remain vulnerable to poverty, disease, and 
underdevelopment. And all of us are exposed to ethnic and religious hatred, the 
reckless aggression of rogue states, terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking, the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. [...] hese forces jeopardize the global 
trend toward peace and freedom, undermine fragile new democracies, sap the 
strength from developing countries, threaten our efforts to build a safer, more 
prosperous world. So today I call upon all nations to join us in the fight against them. 
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Our common efforts can produce results. [...] To take on terrorists, we maintain 
strong sanctions against states that sponsor terrorism and defy the rule of law, such 
as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Sudan. We ask them today again to turn from that path. 
Meanwhile, we increase our own law enforcement efforts and our cooperation with 
other nations.” (Clinton 1995) 
In 1997, Madeleine Albright restated with more emphasis the universal American 
response to those who willingly stay outside of the U.S. zone of stability and engagement: 
“to strengthen the bonds among those countries that make up the growing community of 
major market democracies... to help emerging democracies get on their feet... to reform 
or isolate the rogue states... to contain the chaos and ease the suffering in the regions of 
greatest humanitarian concern” (qtd. in Boys 2015: 88).  In this speech, one side of the 
coin is the evermore integrated world, and the other is the realm of rogue states that were 
to be either reformed or isolated. 
Isolation, indeed, was sometimes considered a magic word for solving problems. 
Its popularity within the administration went so far that it caused the downfall of a leader 
of the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). In September 1996, CIA director John Deutch 
told Congress that economic sanctions would never be able to stop Saddam Hussein from 
overcoming and undermining the international order. Not soon after Deutch was 
dismissed, and Clinton appointed Tony Lake to the position. This was, on the other hand, 
a disastrous choice: Lake was considered a McGovernite, a draft-burner, and too soft on 
security by the Republicans, and thus unfit for the position. As Lake became the primary 
target of Republican criticism, he finally stepped back from nomination (Ambrose–
Brinkley 1997). 
The most important lesson of the evolution of the rogue state doctrine was that in 
fact it did not entirely stop proliferation, drug-trafficking, or subversion, while it could 
not do a lot to improve the general situation of human rights, either. The idea that rogue 
nations needed to be isolated from the rest of the world is in fact contradictory to the main 
idea of engagement. 
If engagement is “reverse domino theory” (phrasing by Brinkley 1997: 116), then 
isolation cannot improve but only worsen a situation. If a country choses to close up in 
terms of politics and economy, a remedy cannot be to place it in an international ghetto. 
The latter policy might cause some unpleasant moments but would still very much be in 
line with the original goal of such a “rogue nation,” not to mention the potential 
propaganda value of this kind of hostile isolation. 





Based upon the above discussion of the evolution of the ideas of enlargement and 
engagement, or geoeconomics, it may be timely to present a short evaluation of both the 
term and its application. As for its application, most analysts agree that the Clinton 
administration’s time was an economic success story. The wealth accumulated during this 
period in virtually all segments of American society is threefold. As a short-term causal 
factor behind this, the temporary good luck with commodity prices was decisive. In the 
middle run, sound macroeconomics also deserve credit as a major achievement of the 
Clinton team. In the long run, globalization, deregulation, innovation, and the 
apportioning of credit need to be mentioned (Frankel–Orszag 2001), most of which also 
had an immediate connection to Clinton’s policies. 
On the theoretical level, one may now offer an answer as to what geoeconomics 
precisely means. Based on the research for this paper, it is clear that the whole concept is 
quite vague. It does not have axioms, and does not follow rules. There is no precise 
description of actions and reactions. All that can be said is that geoeconomics is the 
primacy of trade and the economy in global affairs, as well as a deep belief in the forces 
of globalization, in a world that is on the way of ever-expanding integration. For this 
integration, the lowering/elimination of trade barriers is essential. Thus, geoeconomics 
prescribes no policy solutions to crises, disputes, or disagreements, and by no means 
promotes trade wars – even if there have been some in the 1990s, it did not constitute a 
central tenet of the geoeconomics approach. Geoeconomics also did not answer the 
question of whether the link between free trade and democracy is structural or causal, 
which would have been a strong basis on which to build a more elaborate idea. 
One last question to tackle is the relation of geoeconomics and democracy 
promotion during the Clinton administration, or in other words, whether geoeconomics 
(i.e. the primacy of trade) served democratization, or if democratization served 
geoeconomics. Judging from the rather reluctant attitude to intervention, the cost-efficient 
nature of foreign policy, as well as the military and political  downscaling (affecting e.g. 
the U.S. Information Agency) throughout the world, it was arguably the democratization 
factor that was intended to help geoeconomics. While trade relations and economic 
growth were actively pursued policies during the 1990s, democratization was only 
supportive of these, if not an in fact passive item on Clinton’s agenda. In Michael Cox’s 
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words, “promoting democracy was not a moral duty but a policy instrument to advance 
American power” (paraphrased by Poppe 2010: 12). 
Remembering, however, the differences between Republican and Democratic free 
trade ideologies, it is also clear that in the very long run, even geoeconomics may serve 
democratization: an open, competitive, integrated globe was the teleological objective of 
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